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ABSTRACT
We present an account of the phenomenon of music based upon the hypothesis that there is a close parallel 
between the mechanics of life and the mechanics of mind, a key factor in the correspondence proposed being
the existence of close parallels between the concepts of gene and musical idea. The hypothesis accounts for 
the specificity, complexity, functionality and apparent arbitrariness of musical structures.  An implication of 
the model is that music should be seen as a phenomenon of transcendental character, involving aspects of 
mind as yet unstudied by conventional science.
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The following text is based on a paper presented at Toward A Scientific Basis for Consciousness, a 
conference held at the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA in April 1994.
Music and the Nature of the Mind
Is the phenomenon of music to be understood in conventional biological terms, or is it instead an activity 
dependent upon subtler aspects of mind? Conventional explanations may be able to explain certain capacities
in music (such as the ability to recognise and define particular categories of pattern, structure or 
relationship), on the basis of the fact that possession of such abilities may confer selective advantages.  What 
is more difficult to account for, using such arguments, is the specific forms that appear to be favoured in 
music, and which appear to possess a curious generative capacity or 'fertility' not possessed by arbitrary 
patterns of sound.  Specifically, one often finds at the beginning of a piece of music a short and usually 
discrete unit (typical examples being the first theme of Mozart's Symphony No. 40, the opening bars of 
Beethoven's String Quartet Op. 95 and, on a larger scale, the leitmotif which begins Wagner's opera Tristan 
und Isolde), containing distinctive harmonic, melodic and emotional patterning, which functions as the germ 
of elaborations in the course of the subsequent development.  The fertility of such special forms or musical 
ideas is emphasised by the way a composer may develop an existing idea in a new way (cf. Schubert's use of 
the initial idea in Mozart's String Quintet in C major in his own String Quintet in C).  These 'musical ideas' 
resemble the memes of Dawkins (1989).  It will be argued here that the specificity of these forms cannot be 
readily accounted for within conventional frameworks of explanation, and that better explanations are likely 
to be obtained by involving subtler aspects of mind than those normally taken into account.
The phenomenon of interest can be defined as the special effects on consciousness of the specific constituent 
patterns or ideas found in good music, the striking effects of the latter being in clear contrast to those of the 
forms created by mediocre composers or by mechanical procedures. Skilled composers do not produce 
innovations in a mechanical way; rather they appear to possess an intuitive ability to be aware of the creative 
potentials of particular patterns of sound even when considered in their most elementary forms, and then 
develop a composition from these 'germs' (cf. Schoenberg 1977, 1984).
At a superficial level, the specificity that has been discussed resembles that of a resonance, but this analogy 
does not appear to be a very helpful one since we are dealing with a highly non-linear system; the true 
mechanism must be rather different in nature.  We shall dismiss explanations based on conditioning, because 
the differences in style between an innovative composition and music that a listener has been exposed to 
previously account for a considerable part of its interest, and while conditioning can account for a listener's 
ability to process competently a new piece of music in a familiar style it cannot explain why particular 
innovations should have particularly powerful effects.  Apart from this there are two main categories of 
possible explanation:
1) genetic explanations, to the effect that for each musical idea there is a corresponding gene coding for 
nervous system structure corresponding to selective sensitivity to that idea. Regarding this type of 
explanation, while some musical ideas may have correlates in the natural world, the majority do not, so that 
there would be no selective advantage in possessing such sensitivity.  It also seems unlikely that the 
collection of sensitivities to musical ideas can be explained as accidental consequences of other adaptations.  
It seems to us that the only way of avoiding these problems would be to postulate that during the course of 
evolution there had been a species that used as a means of communication music very similar to the kind 
produced by human composers, and which had undergone a process of evolution that was the genetic 
equivalent of the human cultural evolution of music, by this means evolving genes corresponding to the 
musical sensitivities that have been postulated.  This seems unlikely to have been the case.
2) 'theory of everything' type explanations: the idea that there may be some universal formula or principle 
that distinguishes effective musical ideas from ineffective ones (in the same way as in the case of chemistry 
there is a universal formula, viz. Schroedinger's equation, that can distinguish between stable and unstable 
molecules).  A related perceptual mechanism would provide the observed discrimination between good 
music and bad.
Attempts have been made by musical psychologists (e.g. Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, Narmour 1990) to 
discover such principles, but these attempts seem to us, in their present stage of development, grossly 
inadequate to the purpose, and to provide us with little illumination concerning the problems addressed here. 
There is in addition a further argument against 'theory of everything' type explanations of musicality. This 
kind of explanation, in contrast to the other kinds of explanation discussed (viz. cultural and genetic 
explanations), allows essentially no scope for arbitrary factors to enter into the determination of the preferred
forms.  Given the apparently capricious nature of musical regularities, the kind of explanation that does 
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allow arbitrary factors to enter seems considerably more plausible.
While none of the above arguments is conclusive, the difficulties we have been noted provide some 
motivation for seeking alternatives. Elsewhere (Josephson and Carpenter 1994) the authors have commented 
on the existence of interesting parallels (principally involving matters concerning information and 
regulation) between aesthetic processes and life processes. These parallels will now be developed further.
In the present context, the most basic parallel is that between effective musical pattern and gene, both being 
informational structures playing a key role in the activities of those structures that contain them (organism 
and musical mind).   In the case of life, the genes help to determine the forms and activities of the structures 
that cause the genes to be replicated so that they survive.  Particular gene structures generate particularly 
effective functional systems, and this very often entails high complexity since complex means are generally 
needed to produce simple results in an effective manner.  Other contributions to complexity come from the 
complexity of the chemistry involved and the fact that genes often do not produce their effects in isolation.  
Further, in organisms there are clear means-end relationships related to the functionality of structures, by 
virtue of which the functional structures can be considered 'significant'. In contrast to the perspicuity of the 
processes involved at the functional level, the details at the structural level are complex, and related to 
function in a complex way, which generally has arbitrary aspects as a consequence of the way that nature 
operates opportunistically rather than logically.
We now observe the ways in which music possesses features paralleling those discussed in the case of life:
(i) effective musical structures are highly specific, as well as being (subjectively) functional;
(ii) while there is an overall logic behind the way that a given piece of music works, many of the details of 
form appear essentially arbitrary.  The functional descriptions are considerably simpler than descriptions at 
the detailed level of the structure.
A further fact about music that is clarified by this picture is its perceived semantic aspect.  Biological 
structures in general can be considered to have a semantic connected with means-end relationships.  These 
semantic aspects can be divided into internal ones (related to direct maintenance of the organism independent
of its environment) and external (maintenance dependent upon interactions with the environment). 
Correspondingly, in the case of music, some components appear to have external reference (that is to say 
they appear to relate in a general way to ordinary events in the world) (Meyer 1959), while others appear to 
be significant only in relation to the piece of music in which they appear.
These features of music could be understood if the mode of operation of mind were in general terms similar 
to that of life. According to this view, intelligence would be the product of a collection of adaptations capable
of being specified by a coding system related to that of music.  The fertility of particular musical patterns 
would reflect the operation of the specific adaptations specified by these patterns.  Individual minds would 
make use of such adaptations in the same way as in ordinary biology individual organisms make use of 
genes.  While the development of the organism, excluding mind, centers around the use that can be made of 
chemistry, the development of mind centers around the use that may be made of ideas and thought.
The question arises, which is the mind-system in which the processes we have been discussing occur?  It 
cannot be the minds of individuals, since the preferences that the model is intended to explain are not those 
of individuals.  Neither can it be the cultural mind (consisting of individuals communicating with each other 
musically) because, as discussed in connection with explanations based on conditioning, the selective 
response to innovations cannot be explained purely culturally.  What remains is activity involving some kind 
of collective or universal mind. Our model thus entails a Platonic picture of the mind, where much of the 
intelligence of the individual is the consequence of preexisting ideas in some mind-sphere.  It follows that 
the study of music is at the same time the study of the quasi-genetic aspects of this subtler realm of mind.  
Such studies may thus be able to inform us of aspects of mind not accessible to conventional studies that tend
to focus on the more intellectual aspects of mind to the exclusion of its more intuitive ones.  It may be worth 
pointing out here also that the idea that there is a fundamental connection between sound and form is an 
ancient one, dating back thousands of years in the Eastern philosophical tradition.
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